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Using survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and Encuesta 
Nacional Sobre la Inseguridad (ENSI) for Mexico during the period 2004-2010, this paper 
analyses the impact of insecurity and crime victimization on support and satisfaction with 
democracy and trust in institutions. With the LAPOP data, perceptions about higher insecurity 
decrease support and satisfaction with democracy. Perceptions of insecurity and crime 
victimization have a negative significant effect on trust in institutions, and this finding is robust 
to using LAPOP and ENSI data. Perceptions of insecurity and crime victimization have a larger 
negative effect on trust in institutions that directly deal with crime, such as the police and judicial 
system. Data also shows that those states with higher drug trafficking activity show lower trust in 
institutions, and that trust in institutions has deteriorated over time at a faster pace in the 
northeast and northwest regions.  
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Crime in Latin America is very high when compared to other regions of the world and 
there is evidence that crime rates have increased in the last two decades, making insecurity one 
of the most important issues pressing the region (Di Tella et al., 2010). While unemployment has 
been the main problem that people worried about in Latin America (since 1995 when the 
Latinobarometro survey started), crime became a significant concern in 2008 and its importance 
became more evident in 2010. The latest report from the Latinobarometro (2010) shows that the 
percentage of the population who believe that crime is the most important problem has been 
rising, from 9 percent in 2004 to 27 percent in 2010.1 The relevance of dealing with crime in 
Latin America also became obvious with the approach taken by the United States in terms of 
foreign policy. The current administration of the United States continues to support Mexico’s 
and Colombia efforts to deter drug trafficking, and it has started a partnership with Central 
America and the Caribbean for new initiatives related to diminishing crime, violence, and drug 
trade (White House, 2011).  
Insecurity in Mexico has risen since President Calderon took office in late 2006. This 
increase in insecurity is related to Calderon’s program to fight drug cartels and diminish drug 
trafficking in the country. Drug turf wars also contribute to the increase on crime. The homicide 
rate at the national level (number of homicides per 100 000 habitants) increased from 11 in 2006 
to 18 in 2010, which represents a 64 percent increase (Table 1). The total number of homicides 
related to organized crime (i.e. drug-trafficking) increased by 440 percent between 2007 and 
2010 (Table 1). The total of homicides related to organized crime between December of 2006 
                                                             
1 According to the Consulta de San Jose carried by the Inter-American Development Bank in October of 
2007 crime was considered as a top priority for the Latin American region (Lomborg, 2009).  
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and December of 2010 ads up to 34,620. This number of deaths is of significant magnitude when 
compared to the number of combat deaths during the Mexican Revolution in 1910, which adds to 
250,000 in a ten year period (Krauze and Heifetz, 1998). The annual average of deaths related to 
organized crime is equal to 8,655, which represents around 35 percent of the annual average of 
combat deaths during the Mexican revolution. Thus, addressing crime and violence in Mexico is 
one of the top priorities for policymakers.  
Because dealing with insecurity has become a pressing public policy issue in Latin 
America, it is important to study the causes and consequences of crime. While there are 
significant economic consequences of crime, there are also other consequences related to 
institutional stability (Soares & Naritomi, 2010). Trust, in the political system and institutions, is 
related to social capital, and social capital is considered an engine for economic growth and 
development (Knack and Keefer, 1997). Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to analyze, in the 
Mexican context, the impact of insecurity on support and satisfaction with democracy and trust 
in institutions.  
Focusing on the impact of crime on democracy and trust in institutions is relevant 
because Latin American countries have experienced a successful process of democratization 
since the 1980s, but there are some deficiencies in their political systems (Hagopian and 
Mainwaring, 2005). In the case of Mexico, political transformation and electoral democratization 
took place with the elections of 2000, and the country seemed to be moving towards establishing 
a consolidated liberal democracy (Haber et al., 2008). Because Mexico can be considered a 
young democracy, strengthening democracy and institutions is necessary to ensure future 
economic development and political stability. Institutions in which citizens can trust are 
important for improving social and economic conditions in Mexico. If insecurity proves to have 
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a detrimental effect on trust in institutions, then it will be necessary to pay more attention to 
violence issues and design policies that deal with the negative effect that crime has on 
institutional development. 
When looking at the impact of insecurity on support for democracy and trust on 
institutions in Latin America, previous analyses use data from the Latin American Public 
Opinion Project (LAPOP) or the Latinobarometro for a specific year (Paras et al., 2010; Paras 
and Moreno, 2008; Malone, 2009, among others). Most of these studies find that being a victim 
of crime and feeling insecure have a negative effect on support and satisfaction with democracy 
and trust in institutions. The empirical approach in this analysis expands on previous work by 
using a framework of repeated cross sections of surveys during the pre (2004 and 2006) and post 
(2008 and 2010) periods that relate to high levels of violence in Mexico. This approach allows 
detangling whether there is a time effect related to satisfaction and support with democracy and 
trust in institutions in Mexico during this period of time.  
This paper also differs from previous work by incorporating a different survey into the 
analysis, Encuesta Nacional Sobre la Inseguridad (ENSI), which is a nationally representative 
Mexican survey available for the 2004, 2007, 2008, and 2009. Using this data allows analyzing 
in depth the effect that insecurity has on trust on institutions that deal with crime issues, such as 
the different police forces. This paper expands on previous work by exploring whether those 
regions with more drug trafficking activity are likely to show different levels of trust in 
institutions, and if there is change over time. This paper also expands on previous work by 
incorporating techniques related to complex survey design. 
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When using the LAPOP data, results shows that perceptions of insecurity have a robust 
negative effect on support and satisfaction with democracy. This analysis also shows that 
perceptions of insecurity and crime victimization have a significant negative effect on trust in 
institutions, and this finding is robust to using LAPOP and ENSI data. Another important 
finding, that is robust to using different datasets, is that the negative effect of perceptions of 
insecurity and crime victimization on trust in the police and the judicial system is of larger 
magnitude when the effect is compared to other institutions. When using some indicators that 
relate to drug trafficking activity at the state level (distance to border and number of narcos 
residing in the state), there is evidence that trust in institutions decreases as drug trade activity 
increases. In relation to time variation, there is evidence that trust in institutions has deteriorated 
at a faster pace in the northwest and northeast states.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the literature review providing a 
brief overview of insecurity in Mexico during the late 2000s and a review of the literature on the 
impact of insecurity on democracy and trust in institutions. Section III presents the data and 
methodology. Sections IV and V discuss the results and sensitivity analysis. Section V 
concludes. 
 
II. Literature Review 
A. Insecurity in Mexico during the late 2000s 
Official statistics for Mexico show that crime has risen significantly since 2006, where 
those states that have more illegal drug trade activity show larger increases on crime. The 
increase on violence during this period has been associated with Calderon’s efforts to fight drug 
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cartels. Fighting organized crime has been a top priority for the government since Calderon took 
office in December of 2006, where the Mexican government has increased security spending 
significantly and has mobilized military forces to the Mexican Border States (Beittel, 2009). The 
increase of crime has also been attributed to the turf wars that resulted from the government 
actions to deter organized crime, which brought instability into the structure of drug cartels. 
However, Escalante (2011) notes that in 2008 and 2009 crime has increased to unexpected 
levels, and he argues that this increase in crime is explained by weak municipal police forces. 
With a weak local police there is a state of insecurity that spurs violence.  
The intentional homicide rate (homicides per 100,000 habitants) during the late 2000s is 
shown in Table 1. The percentage change of this indicator between 2006 and 2010 for the border 
states of Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, Sonora, Tamaulipas and Baja California was equal 
to 472, 350, 250, 160, 100, and 59, respectively (in descending order). Most of these states, with 
the exception of Baja California, show an average growth of this indicator higher than the 
percentage change at the national level (64 percent). When looking at the percentage change of 
homicide rates between 2001 and 2005, there is a stark difference. Table 1 presents the homicide 
rates by state for 2001 and 2005 and the percentage change, where the national homicide rate 
decreased by 21 percent during this period. The largest percentage change during the 2001-2005 
period was equal to100 in Tamaulipas, and only seven states show an increase in the homicide 
rate. Figures 1 and 3 present (heat) maps of Mexico for incidental and organized crime related 
homicides in the late 2000s, respectively. In these maps, darker colors are assigned to those 
states with higher increases in homicides. These maps show that the increase on crime seems to 
be more prominent in certain regions of the country, where several states in the Northwest (Baja 
California, Baja California Sur, Chihuahua, Sonora, Durango, Sinaloa) and Northeast region 
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(Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas) experienced higher increase on intentional and organized 
crime related homicides. Other states in the Occident region, such as Nayarit and Colima also 
show higher increases on homicides. Thus, this maps show that the increase on violence seems to 
be focalized on certain regions in Mexico.2 
It is important to put the statistics of crime discussed above in context with a country in 
the region that has experienced high crime rates and drug-trafficking activity: Colombia. 
Homicide rates (intentional, per 100 thousand individuals) in Colombia  in the 2000s show a 
decreasing trend, where this rate was equal to 66 in 2002, to 37 in 2006 and to 34 in 2010 
(Observatorio de Politica y Estrategia en America Latina, 2011). The comparable homicide rate 
in Mexico in 2010 was almost half the homicide rate in Colombia (equal to 18 at the national 
level), but it is important to note that this rate has been rising at a period of time where we 
observe a decrease on crime in Colombia.  
Table 2 shows which states that have been affected the most by drug cartel turf wars, and 
which cartels are fighting among each other for dominance in the specific state (Secretaria de 
Gobernacion, SEGOB, 2011). According to a report from the SEGOB (2011) the most violent 
states, where 80 percent of drug trafficking related crimes takes place, are Baja California, 
Chihuahua, Michoacan, Nuevo Leon, Sinaloa, and Tamaulipas. These states show in general an 
increasing trend in the total number of homicides related to organized crime between 2007 and 
2010, where Chihuahua shows the highest increase (Figure 3). In other states in which there is 
significant violence related to drug cartel activities, such as Coahuila, Durango, Guerrero, 
                                                             
2 Maps were constructed as “heat” maps using the application provided by OpenHeatMap, which can be 
accessed at http://www.openheatmap.com/. Heat maps for intentional homicides percentage change 
(2006-2010) and for organized crime related homicides percentage change (2007-2010) shown in figures 
1 and 2 can be downloaded at http://www.openheatmap.com/view.html?map=BeetleheadsIntrapialSiwens 
and http://www.openheatmap.com/view.html?map=DecorementPactAssaria.  
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Jalisco, Morelos, and Sonora, there is also an increasing trend in homicides related to organized 
crime (Figure 4).  
Official statistics show that Mexico has suffered a significant increase in violence and 
crime in the late 2000s. While official statistics are important in order to determine the level of 
insecurity, it is also important to look at other surveys on crime victimization and perceptions of 
insecurity. These surveys give a better picture of the level of insecurity experienced by 
individuals since many crimes are not officially reported in the developing world, and they will 
not be included in official statistics. In fact, according to Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios Sobre 
la Inseguridad (ICESI, 2011a), only 22 percent of crimes are officially reported to the authorities 
in Mexico. The main reason why individuals fail to report a crime is because they feel it is futile 
to do so. There are two different surveys that can provide a better picture of insecurity in 
Mexico: LAPOP and ENSI.  
The LAPOP report for 2010 provides evidence that there has been an increase on 
insecurity in Mexico associated with the rise of drug trafficking related crime (Paras et al., 2011). 
When looking at the index of perceptions of insecurity across Latin America, Mexico is the 9th 
most insecure country. Peru, Argentina, El Salvador, Venezuela and Belize are the top five 
countries where perceptions of insecurity are at the highest level (in descending order). Colombia 
is below Mexico in this ranking, occupying the 15th place in the list of most insecure countries in 
Latin America. During 2010, a 25.9 percent of people were victim of a crime in Mexico, which 
puts the country in the 6th place in relation to crime victimization (after Peru, Ecuador, 
Venezuela, Bolivia and Argentina, in descending order). Colombia is actually below Mexico, 
occupying 10th place, where 20.5 percent of the population has been victim of a crime in 2010. 
When looking at the index of perception of insecurity and crime victimization over time for 
  9
Mexico, there seems to be an increasing trend. Table 3 shows that the average perception of 
insecurity increased from 2.2 in 2004 to 2.3 in 2010 (Scale: 1-4; very insecure = 4, very secure 
=1). There is also a significant increase (according to a t test, Table 3) in the percentage of 
population that has been a victim of crime between 2004 and 2010, where this percentage jumps 
from 17 percent to 26 percent.  
The latest report provided by ICESI (2011a) on the ENSI data for 2009 also notes that 
there has been an increase on the perception of insecurity during the 2000s in Mexico. Table 3 
shows that the percentage of the population that feels insecure increased from 59 percent in 2007 
to 65 percent in 2008 and 2009. In relation to crime victimization, the percentage of the 
population that was victim of a crime actually decreased from 11.5 in 2008 to 10.1 in 2009. 
However, if the percentage is taken at the household level we observe a small increase from 13.3 
to 13.7 percent.  
There are some limitations in relation to the LAPOP and ENSI data. The increase on the 
percentage of population that has been victim of a crime in the LAPOP data might also be due to 
a change on which the question was structured in the 2010 survey, where more description was 
given in relation to what a crime means. With the ENSI data, according to the ICESI (2011a), 
one of the reasons we might observe a decrease on the percentage of the population who suffered 
a crime is because Insituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (INEGI) carried out the survey in 
the reference 2009 year and ICESI had no significant involvement. A decrease in crime 
victimization in the ENSI data might be due to a significant increase in the number of questions 
on the survey. In addition, there were several parts of the country where ENSI data was not 
collected due to insecurity issues (there were a large number of houses that were not surveyed in 
the states of Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, and Chihuahua). While there are some limitations with 
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the data, these instruments are the only ones available to carry out studies on the impact of 
insecurity in Mexico. 
In sum, Mexico shows high rates of insecurity and crime during the late 2000s from 
official statistics and individual surveys. Mexico’s crime rates and insecurity levels are high in 
comparison to other Latin American countries, and it is evident that there has been an increasing 
trend in crime and violence in the last couple of years. The increase of insecurity has become an 
important issue for social policy in Mexico, and it is necessary to study the impact that crime has 
on factors related to economic development. The rise in crime in Mexico seems to be closely 
related to an increase on organized crime that is interconnected with illegal drug trade activity.  
Thus, determining the impact of the increase of insecurity in Mexico can provide insights in 
relation to the true effects that organized crime has in society.  
This analysis focuses on determining the impact of insecurity and crime on democracy 
and trust in institutions because these factors are relevant for building strong political and 
institutional systems that increase social capital, and consequently, conducive to economic 
growth. According to Coleman (1988) trust in institutions is a form of social capital, which 
compares to other forms of capital (financial, physical, and human). Social capital is closely 
related to development because the quality of institutions depends on the degree to which 
individuals trust and cooperate with each other, where those societies with higher trust are likely 
to develop strong and efficient institutions (Fukuyama, 2002). Empirically, Knack and Keefer 
(1997) show that greater trust is associated with higher economic growth. In fact, in the Latin 
American context, Booth and Bayer (2009) and Klesner (2007) show that trust is associated with 
political participation. Thus, support for democracy and trust in institutions are important factor 
in order to promote economic development.    
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B. The impact of insecurity on democracy and trust in institutions  
From the theoretical standpoint, it is expected that perceptions of high insecurity and 
crime victimization might have a detrimental effect on support for democracy and trust in 
institutions. Individuals’ perceptions of government effectiveness dealing with social issues are 
closely related to their experience with their social environment and current institutions, where 
trust is likely to depend on this experience.  
 Because democratic institutions in the Latin American region are relatively new, 
especially in Mexico, studying the effect of insecurity on support and satisfaction with 
democracy is relevant for the region. Theoretically, the effect of insecurity and crime on support 
and satisfaction with democracy can be ambiguous in the Latin American context. It could be 
expected that because there is a history of authoritarian regimes, individuals might be more 
likely to support stronger leaders that can take authoritarian measures against crime when there is 
high insecurity. This argument goes along the one proposed by Chinchilla (2002), where she 
argues that the erosion of legitimacy might justify a “mano dura.” The rise on insecurity can also 
lead individuals to be less satisfied with democracy because they are likely to have high 
expectations about the outcomes of a democratic system. Under this case, perceptions of high 
insecurity might have a negative effect on support and satisfaction with democracy.  
On the other hand, we could also expect that even if insecurity represents a threat to the 
well being of society, individuals might rationalize that democracy is a lesser evil than an 
authoritarian regime. Individuals might expect that while democracy has not fulfilled 
expectations, the rise on crime is not necessarily a consequence of democracy.  Under this 
argument, the increase on insecurity might have no effect on support and satisfaction with 
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democracy. The increase on insecurity can even lead to an increase on support for democracy as 
individuals might feel that democracy is the only way to move forward. Additionally, if 
individuals do not perceive that democratic institutions are the cause of insecurity, insecurity 
might have no effect on satisfaction and support for democracy. 
When looking at the impact of violence on democracy, it is necessary to make a 
distinction between perceptions of insecurity and crime victimization. While a victim of crime 
might be more vulnerable and likely to show high insecurity levels, she is also more likely to 
have a greater experience dealing with institutions that deal with crime, such as the police and 
judicial system. Making the distinction is important since only a portion of the population is a 
victim of crime. On the other hand, the entire population will form perceptions of insecurity 
based not only on their own experience, but also on the experience of relatives, friends, and 
community members. Thus, looking at perceptions of insecurity provide us with a broader 
indicator of insecurity.  
Another important effect to study is the impact of crime and insecurity on individuals’ 
trust in institutions such as the government, political system, and police. It is expected that if 
individuals feel highly insecure and/or have been victims of crime, they might be less likely to 
trust the current institutional system. With high insecurity, individuals are likely to put the blame 
on current institutions and regard them as inefficient and corrupt, and consequently, will trust 
institutions less. According to Easton’s seminal work (1975), if individuals are discontent with 
the system for long time, they are likely to end up distrusting the system entirely. High crime 
rates and perceptions of insecurity affect individual’s levels of trust in the police because the 
police is regarded as the authority responsible to ensure order (Weyland, 2003). Furthermore, it 
is argued that in order for democracy to consolidate, it is necessary that society regards the 
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political system as a legitimate system that relates to other institutions of authority such as the 
police, judicial system, and government (Diamond 1993, Lipset 1994, Cheibub et al., 1996) High 
insecurity and violence would lead individuals to see the current system as inefficient, and trust 
in the authorities will diminish, leading to low social capital (Paras, 2007). 
There are several empirical studies on the impact of insecurity and crime on democracy 
and trust in institutions for Latin American countries, and Table 4 presents a summary of 
previous work that is closely related to this analysis.3 Several studies, that include a large set of 
Latin American countries and use LAPOP or Latinobarometro data for a specific year, show that 
perceptions of insecurity have a significant negative effect on support for democracy (Cruz 2008, 
Fernandez and Kuenzi 2010, Salinas and Booth 2011). Crime victimization has a negative effect 
on satisfaction with democracy in the Latin American region in Fernandez’ and Kuenzi (2010) 
and Cenabou’s et al. (2011) work. When looking at studies that focus on Central America, Perez 
(2003), Cruz (2006), and Malone (2010) also find that perceptions of insecurity have a negative 
effect on trust in institutions. In relation to crime victimization there is evidence that it increases 
support for military coups in El Salvador (Perez, 2003) and decreases support for the political 
and judicial system (Cruz 2006, Malone 2010). 
There are several analyses using LAPOP data for a specific year that show similar results 
to those mentioned above for Mexico. Some of these studies, such as the ones undertaken by 
Paras and Moreno (2008) and Paras et al. (2010), take a formal multivariate regression analysis 
using data in 2008 and 2010, separately. These studies show that perceptions of insecurity have a 
significant negative effect on support for democracy and trust in institutions. While crime 
                                                             
3 There are other studies that focus on a single Latin American country published by LAPOP. Discussion 
of these papers is not included for purpose of space and to put emphasis on those papers that relate to 
Mexico. 
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victimization has an effect on trust in institutions in Paras’ and Moreno (2008) analysis, it does 
not show an effect on the rule of law in Paras’ et al (2010). Earlier studies using LAPOP data in 
2004 (Buendia and Moreno, 2004) and 2006 (Paras and Coleman, 2006), focus on correlations 
between variables related to insecurity and trust in institutions. These studies find that corruption 
has a negative effect on democracy in 2004 and that perceptions of insecurity and crime 
victimization have a negative effect on trust in institutions in 2006. 
This paper differs from previous work in several ways. First, this analysis uses different 
econometric techniques that have not been used by previous analyses on the topic. This analysis 
takes a repeated cross section surveys approach using available surveys between 2004 and 2010. 
Taking this approach allows determining whether the relation of insecurity and crime with 
democracy and trust in institutions is stable over time. With a repeated cross section we are able 
to determine whether there are aggregate trends and group differences in trends, test for changing 
effects, and capture the net effect of social change (Firebaugh, 1997). This study also focuses on 
the use of adequate estimators for the specific research questions (ordered logit and multinomial 
logit). Another main contribution of this paper is that it applies statistical models for complex 
survey data, which has not been done in previous work on this topic. 
Second, this analysis does a comprehensive study on how perceptions of insecurity and 
crime victimization affect the following: 1) support and satisfaction with democracy and 2) trust 
in institutions. Previous studies focused on only one of these issues and most of them enter 
perceptions and crime victimization in the same equation. Because crime victimization and 
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perceptions of insecurity should be highly correlated, it is important to take an empirical 
approach that deals with that by entering these variables one at the time.4   
Third, this study uses data from LAPOP and ENSI. One of the benefits of using two 
different data sources is that it allows testing for the robustness of the relationships of interest. 
Another benefit of using two data sources is that they complement each other. While data on 
support and satisfaction with democracy is only provided by LAPOP surveys, ENSI data has 
more information related to trust in institutions. Furthermore, using ENSI data is beneficial since 
it is a more comprehensive national survey on insecurity, where the number of observations is 
significantly higher compared with LAPOP, and ENSI surveys are representative at the national 
and state level.5 There are several analyses on the impact of insecurity on trust in democracy and 
institutions using LAPOP data, but there is no analysis that uses ENSI data. 
Fourth, this analysis will also explore whether there is a regional difference and time 
variation when looking at the impact of insecurity and crime on trust in institutions. Because 
there has been a significant increase on violence in certain regions of Mexico, it is important to 
determine whether there is a variation across regions and across time in terms of trust in 
institutions. This paper expands on previous work by studying whether trust on institutions is 
associated with drug trafficking activity. 
 
                                                             
4 The correlation coefficient between the insecurity index and the victim dummy is equal to 0.20, and it is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level in the LAPOP data. For the ENSI data, the correlation 
coefficient between the insecurity dummy and the victim dummy is equal to 0.14 and it is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level as well. Discussion of these variables is provided in the next section of 
the paper.  
5 While LAPOP surveys only have around 1,500 observations per year, ENSI surveys have at least 30,000 
observations per year.  
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III. Data and Methodology 
Two repeated cross sections of surveys are constructed separately to estimate the models 
in this analysis. The main datasets used to construct the repeated cross sections of surveys are 1) 
LAPOP surveys for 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010, and 2) ENSI surveys collected in 2005 (ENSI-
3), 2008 (ENSI-5), 2009(ENSI-6), and 2010(ENSI-7).6 Because these surveys are designed 
differently, a description of these two data sources and the main variables used from each source 
is discussed below.  
A. LAPOP data 
LAPOP surveys are representative at the national level for voting age adults (18 years 
and older, 29 states out of 32) and use a complex sample design, where stratification and 
clustering are taken into account. The sample size for each wave is around 1,500 observations 
and it is an un-weighted survey.7 The main variables of interest from the LAPOP survey are the 
following: 
Variables related to insecurity  
1) Perceptions of insecurity index. - Question: in relation to your neighborhood and the 
probability of being victim of a crime, how secure/insecure do you feel? Scale: 1-4; Very 
insecure = 4, very secure =1.     
                                                             
6 Data for the ENSI-4 wave was not used since it was not representative at the national level. With ENSI 
surveys, usually the reference year is the previous year in which the survey was collected. Because ENSI 
surveys tend to be collected in the first six months, then it seems appropriate to consider the previous year 
as the reference year for the information provided. For example, in ENSI-3, individuals were asked if they 
were a victim of crime in 2004 and this data was collected in 2005. ENSI-5 was collected in 2008 and 
refers to 2007, ENSI-6 was collected in 2009 and refers to 2008, and ENSI-7 was collected in 2010 and 
refers to 2009. 
7 For more discussion on the design of the LAPOP surveys please refer to LAPOP’s website 
(http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/core-surveys.php). 
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2) Crime victimization. - Question: in the last 12 months, have you been a victim of crime? 
Values: 0,1; victim of crime = 1, 0 otherwise. 
Variables related to democracy 
1) Support for democracy (democracy index). - Question: democracy has problems, but it is 
the best form of government. Scale: 1-7; strongly disagree = 1, strongly agree = 7. 
2) Support for democracy (democracy as the best political system). - Question: with which 
of the following sentences do you identify yourself, 1) it is the same to have a democratic 
system than to not have it, 2) democracy is preferable to any other form of government, 
and 3) in some circumstances an authoritarian government is preferable to a democratic 
one. This indicator is used with values 1-3 to evaluate the probability of choosing one 
answer over the most common answer (multinomial logit estimation is used with this 
dependent variable). 
3) Satisfaction with democracy. - Question: in general, how satisfied or unsatisfied are you 
with the form in which democracy functions in Mexico. Rescaled: 1-4; highly satisfied = 
4, highly unsatisfied = 1.8   
Variables related to trust in institutions 
1) Variables related to trust in institutions such as the political system, electoral system, 
congress, government, courts system, judicial system, police, and army. - Question: to 
which degree do you trust the following institution ……? Scale: 1-7, nothing=1, a lot=7. 
                                                             
8 When it is mentioned that the variable was rescaled, it means that it was converted in the inverse way to 
keep consistency across the analysis. For example, for the index of satisfaction with democracy in the 
LAPOP survey the data is structured as highly satisfied equals 1 and highly unsatisfied equals 4, which is 
rescaled to the inverse with the purpose to have an indicator that will show higher values when there is 
higher satisfaction with democracy. 
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The control variables used in the estimations including the LAPOP data are gender 
(female=1, male=0), civil status (relationship - married or in common law marriage=1, single, 
separated, divorced, widow/widower =0), have kids (have kids =1, 0 otherwise), race (two 
dummies: white=1 and mestiza = 1 if individual  indentify as white or mestiza/o), size of city (1-
5, very large-capital=1, rural area=5), education (years of education completed), income level (0-
10, no income=0, highest income range=10), age (number of years). Time dummies for the year 
in which the survey is taken are also included in the estimation.9 Summary statistics for the 
repeated cross section sample by year using the LAPOP data are presented in Table 5.  
B. ENSI data 
ENSI surveys are representative at the national and state level for the population 18 years 
and older, and these surveys use sample complex design (stratification and clustering).10 Because 
ENSI surveys use probability sampling, they provide weights for the different waves at the 
household and individual level and the number of observations for each wave ranges between 
30,000 and 60,000. The variables used are similar to those used with the LAPOP data. For this 
part of the analysis it is not possible to test how perceptions of insecurity and crime victimization 
affect support and satisfaction with democracy since there are no questions included in the 
survey on this topic. The control variables are also a little different due to differences in the 
structure of the survey. A benefit of using ENSI data is that there is more information about trust 
                                                             
9 Other model specifications were explored but not chosen since the fit of the model was maximized with 
the variables chosen. Other variables explored were education dummies (primary, secondary, higher), 
urban dummy, income dummies (high level income/ medium level income), civil status dummies 
(separated, divorced, widow/widower). It is also common to include age to the squared in this type of 
regressions, but when the squared term was included the linear and squared term were both insignificant.  
10 For more discussion on the design of the ENSI surveys please refer to ICESI’s website 
(http://www.icesi.org.mx/estadisticas/estadisticas_encuestasNacionales.asp) 
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in institutions, where there are more categories related to the police. The variables used from the 
ENSI surveys are the following 
   Variables related to insecurity  
1) Perceptions of insecurity. - Question: do you feel insecure in your state? Values: 0,1; Feel 
insecure = 1, 0 otherwise.     
2) Crime victimization. - Question: in the year of …… (year before the survey is taken), 
have you been a victim of crime in this state or another state? Values: 0,1; victim of 
crime=1, 0 otherwise. 
Variables related to trust in institutions 
1) Variables related to trust in institutions such as local police, transit police, state police 
(judicial), federal investigation agency (Agencia Federal de Investigacion, AFI), 
preventive federal police, federal police, public ministry (ministerio publico), army, and 
political parties.11 Rescaled:1-4; a lot = 4, some = 3, a little = 2, none=1; Rescaled 1-3, a 
lot = 3, a little = 2, none=1.12 
The control variables used with the estimations with the ENSI surveys are gender (female=1, 
male=0), age (number of years), age squared, urban (equal to 1 if live in urban area, 0 otherwise), 
education dummies (primary, secondary and high school, and high school more), employment 
status dummies (employed and unemployed; the reference group includes those individuals not 
                                                             
11 For the variable related to trust in AFI, the data was adjusted for the last wave since AFI became the 
ministerial federal police in 2009. It is important to note that this survey specifically asks individuals if 
they are familiar with the institution/authority for which they need to provide their level of trust. If the 
individual does not know the institution/authority, then there is no indicator of trust, and this explains 
why the number of observations varies significantly in the estimations that use trust in institutions as 
dependent variable. 
12 When looking at trust in institutions, ENSI data uses different scales for different institutions. The scale 
1-3 seems to be used the most when it refers more specifically to authorities related to the police forces. 
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in the labor force).13 Time dummies for the reference year of the survey are also included in the 
estimation. Summary statistics for the repeated cross section sample by years using the ENSI 
data are presented in Table 6. 
C. State level data 
Variables included to control for state characteristics are GDP per capita, life expectancy, 
and state dummies.14 Other data at the state level is used to explore whether there is a regional 
variation in the outcome variables. An indicator of proximity to the border was used in order to 
try to account for regions most affected by drug trafficking activity. Distance between Mexican 
states and United States border cities with most activity (similar to Dube’s et al. 2011, and 
Garcia-Sanchez’ 2011 approach) is calculated using latitudes and longitudes, and distance to the 
closest border was used as indicator of proximity to the United States.15 Another indicator used is 
the number of criminals in the drug trafficking business (narco density) living in the state 
                                                             
13 For the education dummies, primary dummy is equal to 1 if the individual completed primary 
education, secondary and high school dummy is equal to one if the individual completed secondary or 
high school, and high school more dummy is equal to one if the individual attended school at higher 
levels. These education dummies are not ideal since they are not able to distinguish between graduating 
from secondary and high school and attaining a higher degree. The education dummies were used this 
way because one of the surveys, ENSI-5 wave, had limited data on education. For the employment status 
dummies, retired, stay home, and incapacitated to work individuals are considered for the not in the labor 
force category. Those that did not work (besides those not in the labor force) were considered 
unemployed for the unemployed category, regardless of whether they were actively looking for a job 
because the survey does not have information on this. In relation to income, there is no data available for 
the latest wave, ENSI-7, and that is why dummies controlling for income are not included. For 
robustness, the model will be estimated controlling for income with the remaining ENSI waves. 
14 GDP per capita at the state level constructed using total real GDP (2003 constant prices, from Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia, INEGI, 2011) and dividing it by total population (from Consejo 
Nacional de la Poblacion, CONAPO, 2011). GDP per capita not available for 2010, but it was filled in 
with linear extrapolation. Life expectancy at the state level obtained from CONAPO (2011). Other 
variables such as unemployment and infant mortality were considered as controls, but were not included 
due to high correlations with GDP per capita and life expectancy. 
15 Longitudes and latitudes of states were obtained from Google maps distance calculator 
(http://www.daftlogic.com/projects-google-maps-distance-calculator.htm). Distance to the United States 
border cities with most activity (classified by Dube et al. 2011) was calculated using the great circle 
distance formula. 
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between 1998 and 2001 per 100,000 habitants provided by Resa Nestares (2004).16 In addition, 
the number of hectares of marihuana confiscated at the state level provided by Secretaria de la 
Defensa Nacional (SEDENA, 2011) is used to account for illegal drug trade activity.17 Finally 
two dummies that distinguish those states in the regions with more violence, northeast and 
northwest, are included in the estimations to evaluate regional variation. Summary statistics in 
each sample (LAPOP and ENSI) for these variables are provided in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
D. Methodology 
The model for the repeated cross-section of surveys is specified as 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ܺߚ ൅  ܶߛ ൅ ܦߤ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
Where i=1,2,…,It; t = 1,2,…,T. Yit represents the value of the dependent variable for the 
ith person in the tth survey, α is a vector of constants, X is a 1xq vector of variables presumed to 
affect the dependent variable, T is a 1xT vector of time dummies for the survey years, D is a 1xD 
vector of state dummies, and εit is a vector of error terms for the ith person in the tth survey.18 The 
methods of estimation used are ordered logit (ordered categorical dependent variable), for most 
estimations, and multinomial logit (mutually exclusive categorical dependent variable). Time 
dummies allow controlling for time effects, while state dummies allow controlling for state 
characteristics that are time invariant. Cluster-robust standard errors with clustering by 
                                                             
16 Resa Nestares (2004) provides an indicators of “narco density” which is equal to the number of 
individuals that were incriminated for the production, possession, and, traffic of drugs (and other acts 
related to drug trafficking) that resided between 1998 and 2001 in a specific state per 100,000 habitants. 
17 SEDENA (2011) provides data on the number of hectares of marihuana localized, confiscated, and 
destroyed by the Mexican army and the air force.  
18 Note that it is not a panel data approach where individuals are followed over time. There is no data on 
crime victimization in Mexico that takes a panel approach.  
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geographic areas that represent the primary sample units (PSUs, clusters) are employed in most 
of the estimations. Cluster-robust standard errors allow dealing with heteroskedasticity of the 
error term, where errors are correlated within clusters at the geographic level.  
Furthermore, statistical models for complex survey data are used when estimating the 
model with ENSI data. For the estimations that consider complex survey design in a repeated 
cross section framework, the weight at the individual level and unique PSUs in each wave are 
considered. Stratification is not considered for the estimations because there is a problem of 
getting a singleton PSU when using data from the ENSI-3 wave. Not considering strata is not a 
problem since using strata tends to decrease the standard errors. Thus, estimates without 
considering strata provide a more conservative approach for evaluating significance.19 
In the estimations, following the model noted in equation 1, the dependent variables are 
indicators that relate to support and satisfaction with democracy and trust in institutions. The 
dependent variables denote higher values when there is higher support and satisfaction with 
democracy and higher trust in institutions. The independent variables of interest are those related 
to perceptions of insecurity and crime victimization. The independent variable that relates to 
perceptions of insecurity denotes higher values for those individuals who feel more insecure in 
the LAPOP survey. In the ENSI survey, individuals are asked whether they feel insecure in their 
state/county, and those who feel insecure are assigned a value of 1. Another independent variable 
of interest is the crime victimization variable, which takes a value of 1 if the individual has been 
victim of a crime.  
                                                             
19 For more discussion on how to apply statistical models for complex survey designs in a repeated cross 
section refer to http://www.stata.com/statalist/archive/2008-10/msg00521.html. More discussion on 
repeated cross section is also provided by Firebaugh (1997). 
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Other independent variables of interest that will be included in the estimation are those 
that allow testing for regional variation that relates to illegal drug trade activity (distance to 
border, narco density, and confiscated marihuana). Two dummies for states in the northeast and 
northwest are introduced also to explore regional variation related to drug trafficking activity.  
The inclusion of time dummies in the estimation allow determining whether there is variation of 
the dependent variables associated with time, which is relevant for the Mexican case due to the 
significant increase on crime and insecurity after 2006. Another indicator included to control for 
time variation is a year trend variable that takes a value of 0-3, where 0 is denoted for the first 
wave and 3 for the latest wave. This year trend will be interacted with the border dummy 
variable to test whether there is a group difference in trends between the border and non border 
Mexican states.20 Only data from ENSI surveys is used to test for regional and time variation 





Estimates for determining the impact of perceptions of insecurity and crime victimization 
in democracy using the LAPOP surveys are shown in Table 7. Estimates shown in columns 1-4 
of Table 7 are obtained using an ordered logit estimator since the dependent variables are 
ordered categorical variables that measure support and satisfaction with democracy. In columns 
1 and 2 estimates show that the index of perception of insecurity has a robust significant negative 
                                                             
20 This part of the analysis refers to what is proposed by Firebaugh (1997) to detect aggregate social 
trends with repeated surveys. 
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effect at the 1 percent level on support and satisfaction with democracy. Estimates show that 
crime victimization is not statistically significant when using the support for democracy index as 
dependent variable (column 3, Table 7), but it is negatively significant at the 1 percent level 
when using the satisfaction with democracy index as dependent variable (column 4, Table 7).  
 LAPOP survey has a question that allows exploring whether individuals are indifferent 
with democracy (value equal to 1), see democracy as the best system (value equal to 2) or will 
justify an authoritarian government in special circumstances (value equal to 3). The multinomial 
logit is used to estimate a model that has this dependent variable. In Table 7, columns 5 and 6 
show the estimates for the first model using the insecurity index as independent variable, and 
columns 7 and 8 show the estimates for the second model using the victim dummy as 
independent variable. It is interesting to see that perceptions of insecurity have a positive effect 
on supporting an authoritarian government under special conditions. This is an interesting result 
as it shows that in Mexico, people might see that an authoritarian government could be more 
effective dealing with crime. This relationship might specific to Mexico’s experience since this 
country has undergone through a process of democratization in the 2000s when the political 
party Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) wins presidential elections for the first time in 2000, and 
this party also won in the following elections in 2006. The late 2000s has been characterized by 
high violence, and individuals might be feeling the need to a different approach to deal with 
crime. Estimates also show that those individuals who were victim of a crime are more likely to 
be indifferent with democracy.  
 When estimating the impact of insecurity and crime victimization on trust in institutions, 
an ordered logit estimator is used. There is a robust negative effect of insecurity on trust in 
institutions. Table 8 shows the estimates where the indices of trust in institutions are used as 
  25
dependent variables and the insecurity index is used as independent variable. These estimates 
show that as insecurity increases, there is a decrease on trust in the political system, electoral 
system, congress, government, courts system, judicial system, police, and army. It is interesting 
to note that when trust in the judicial system and the police are used as dependent variables, the 
insecurity index seems to have the largest negative effect. This finding proves that as people feel 
more insecure, they are likely to trust less those institutions that have the responsibility to fight 
crime.  
Estimates in Table 9, which include the victim dummy, are very similar to those in Table 
8. Results in Table 9 show that being a victim of a crime has a significant negative effect on trust 
in the institutions mentioned above. It is interesting to note that the coefficient of the victim 
dummy is the largest for the models that have trust in the judicial system and the police as well. 
We also observe that the impact of the victim dummy is also larger when using trust in the courts 
system as dependent variable. When using trust in the police as dependent variable, the size of 
the coefficient for the victim dummy is of similar magnitude to the coefficient of the insecurity 
index shown in Table 8. Nonetheless, the size of the coefficient for the victim dummy is of larger 
magnitude than the insecurity index when the dependent variables are trust in the political, 
electoral, judicial, and courts systems, and congress. Individuals who are victim of a crime are 
more likely to go through the judicial and courts systems, and perhaps they are disappointed by 
the experience. Because a large number of crimes go unreported in Mexico, the lower trust in the 
courts and judicial system can be reflected on victims’ perception that these systems are 
corrupted and inefficient and that reporting a crime to the authorities is futile.  
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B. ENSI  
To further understand the impact of insecurity on trust in institution, data from the ENSI 
surveys is used because this survey provides more detailed information about perceptions of 
insecurity, crime victimization, and trust in institutions. The estimations with ENSI data are 
based on an ordered logit estimator that considers complex design with clusters and weights. 
Table 10 present the estimates obtained when different variables related to trust in institutions are 
considered as the dependent variable and a dummy that relates to insecurity in the state is 
included in the right hand side. The dummy related to insecurity is equal to one if a person feels 
insecure in its state of residency. The index of insecurity considered here has a significant 
negative effect at the 1 percent level in all the estimations in Table 10, where the coefficient for 
the insecurity index is the largest when local police is the dependent variable. Estimates in Table 
11 show that being victim of a crime has a significant negative effect at the 1 percent level on 
trust in all institutions but the army. In these estimations, the coefficient of the victim dummy is 
also of larger magnitude for the model that has trust in the local police as dependent variable.   
    
V. Sensitivity Analysis 
A. Robustness Tests 
To sum up from the results discussed above there are several important findings. First, 
using LAPOP data, estimations show that perceptions of insecurity have a robust significant 
negative effect on support and satisfaction with democracy. Crime victimization only has a 
negative effect on satisfaction with democracy. Results also show that perceptions of insecurity 
are associated with support for an authoritarian government under certain circumstances and that 
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being a victim of crime is associated with indifference with the democracy. In relation to trust on 
institutions, LAPOP data shows that perceptions of insecurity and crime victimization have a 
significant negative effect on trust on institutions, where the effect is of larger magnitude on the 
judicial system and the police. Using ENSI data, there is also evidence that insecurity and crime 
victimization have a significant negative effect on trust on institutions, where the effect is of 
larger magnitude on trust on the local police. 
The results discussed above are robust to several alternative estimations using LAPOP 
and ENSI data.21 First, the index of perception of insecurity and victim dummy are entered 
together in the estimation, and results are similar to those found before. In these estimations, the 
insecurity index and the victim dummy keep their significance at least at the 5 percent level in 
most cases. The only difference is that the victim dummy is no longer significant in the models 
that use trust in the army as dependent variables using LAPOP and ENSI data. Second, all 
models were also estimated without state dummies, and previous results are robust in these 
estimations.22 
Other estimations were performed to check for robustness using ENSI data.23 First, 
dummy variables that control for income are included and results stay the same, but sample size 
decreases since there is no data on income in the last ENSI wave (ENSI-7). Second, the models 
were estimated using an insecurity dummy at the county level (how insecure do you feel in your 
                                                             
21 Estimations not included for purpose of space, but are available upon request. 
22 There has been some discussion on whether it is appropriate to include state/country dummies in 
ordered logit/probit models because the inclusion of these dummies leads to biased coefficients and 
standard errors. According to Vince Wiggings’ work, this problem can be diminished as the number of 
observations increases, where a minimum of 50 observations for each group is desirable (see discussion 
on this at the following link http://www.stata.com/statalist/archive/2003-09/msg00103.html). In all the 
estimations of this paper, there are more than 50 observations for each group (i.e. state). As robustness 
check, all the models were also estimated without state dummies and results are virtually the same. 
Results not included for purpose of space, but are available upon request. 
23 Estimations not included for purpose of space, but are available upon request. 
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county). These estimates show the same results as those found before when using the insecurity 
dummy at the state level, the only difference is that the coefficients for the insecurity dummy at 
the county level tend to be larger. Third, when using a dummy that is equal to 1 if there was a 
victim in the household, results are the same as those found before with the victim dummy. In 
these estimations, the coefficients for the victim in the household dummy are smaller than those 
found with the victim dummy, which is as expected. Fourth, the model was also estimated with 
an indicator that distinguishes whether the individual was a victim in the state of residency, and 
results are also virtually the same.  
B. Regional and time variation (with ENSI data)  
It is important to look at time and regional variation in the case of Mexico because some 
regions are affected more by illegal drug trade that is associated with higher levels of violence 
and insecurity has reached high levels in the last years. Thus, this paper expands on previous 
work by determining whether drug trafficking activity affects trust in institutions and how trust 
in institutions has evolved over time in Mexico. Three different indicators are used to proxy for 
drug trafficking activity at the state level: proximity to the United States border, number of drug 
dealers that resided in the state between 1998 and 2001, and number of hectares of marihuana 
confiscated in the year before the reference year of the survey. Table 12 shows the estimates 
including distance to the border and narco density separately and using as dependent variables 
those indices that relate to trust in the institutions that deal with crime and that have been 
collected consistently over time (local police, state police, preventive federal police).24 When 
                                                             
24 In all these estimations the state dummies are not included to avoid issues of multicolinearity. Note that 
the index of trust in the AFI is not included in this part of the analysis since this institution changed name 
in the last ENSI survey. A question that distinguishes federal police from the preventive federal police 
starts in the second wave used in this analysis (ENSI-5). 
  29
looking at the estimations that include the indicator of proximity to the border (Table 12, 
columns 1-3), we observe that proximity to the border has a positive significant effect on trust in 
all the different types of police analyzed here. When including the indicator of narco density in 
the estimations (Table 12, columns 4-6), we observe that narco density has a significant negative 
effect on trust on the local, state, and federal police. From these estimates, it can be inferred that 
greater drug trade activity is associated with lower levels of trust in the police. It is important to 
note that the negative effect of drug trade activity in these estimations seems to be larger for the 
local police.  
In relation to the impact of confiscation of marihuana on trust in institutions, estimates 
presented in columns 1-3 of Table 13 show that confiscation of marihuana has a significant 
positive effect on trust in the local, state, and preventive federal police. This finding is 
contradictory. In one hand, it is expected that more drug trade activity might lead to less trust on 
institutions as it was found when using distance to the border and narco density. On the other 
hand, as the number of marihuana confiscated increases at the state level, then it might expected 
that trust on institutions increases as people perceive that authorities are being effective dealing 
with drug trafficking. One reason that might explain why we find a contradictory sign is because 
confiscation of hectares of marihuana is more likely to happen in rural areas, and therefore this 
indicator might not be providing an exact picture of drug trafficking activity. 
A better understanding of variation across time can be explored through the use of 
repeated cross section surveys. A simple way to look at time variation is to look at the 
significance of the time dummies. In all the estimations mentioned above, time dummies are 
included and the years of 2010 and 2009 are the reference year for the LAPOP and ENSI 
samples, respectively. When using LAPOP data, in most of the estimations there does not seem 
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to be a clear trend since time dummies do not show significance in most cases. When looking at 
time dummies in the estimations that use ENSI data, in general, estimates show that trust in 
several institutions has deteriorated over time. Estimates show that in 4 out of 5 cases, trust in the 
local police shows a negative trend (time dummies are positive indicating that trust was higher in 
previous years). In all 5 cases, trust in the state police and the preventive federal police has 
deteriorated over time.   
To further explore regional and time variation, two dummies for those states in the 
northeast and northwest region, a year trend variable, and an interaction of the year trend with 
the regional dummies are included in the estimations. Estimations including these variables are 
shown in Table 13. In the estimation that has trust in local police as dependent variable (Table 
13, column 1), it is observed that the states in the northwest region have a higher levels of trust 
than other regions. In this estimation, the year trend and the interaction terms are negative and 
statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level. The significance and sign of these terms 
indicate that trust in the local police has been deteriorating over time for all states, but it has been 
deteriorating at a higher rate in the northeast and northwest states. When using state and 
preventive federal police as dependent variables, the interaction terms are negative and 
statistically significant. This indicates that trust in the state and preventive federal police is 
deteriorating at a higher rate in the northwest and northeast regions. Results are very similar 
when a border dummy is included in the model (instead of the two regional dummies) and 






This analysis shows that insecurity has a negative effect on support for democracy and 
trust in institutions in Mexico. In specific estimates show that perceptions of insecurity have a 
negative effect on support for democracy and trust in institutions. Crime victimization seems to 
have a robust effect on trust in institutions, but its effect on democracy is not as robust. It is also 
interesting to note that the detrimental effect of insecurity and crime victimization seems to be 
the largest for trust in institutions that are closely related to security, such as the judicial system 
and the police. This analysis also shows that there is a time variation, where trust in several 
institutions that deal with crime has deteriorated over time. There is also evidence that those 
states with more drug trafficking activity show deterioration at a faster pace of trust in 
institutions over time.    
This analysis is relevant since it empirically evaluates the social and institutional effects 
of crime in society. In the Mexican context, this is of special interest today because it is 
important to design adequate policies that deal with the consequences of crime. Because crime 
seems to have a large negative effect on trust in institutions responsible for dealing with crime 
(police and judicial system), the lack of trust in these institutions might complicate dealing with 
crime in the future. If distrust in the judicial system and the police increases with insecurity, this 
can lead to less crimes being officially reported to the authorities. If crime is not reported 
because of distrust in institutions, then decreasing crime will be more difficult.    
Because “what is not measured is unknown, and what is unknown cannot be solved” (Lo 
que no se mide no se conoce, lo que no se conoce no se puede resolver, ICESI, 2011a) it is 
necessary that policy makers are aware of the effects that crime and insecurity have on support 
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and trust in institutions. From this analysis, a policy recommendation will be to continue relying 
on victimization surveys in order to have a better understanding of crime. Resources must be 
allocated to gather data appropriately and in a timely manner on perceptions of insecurity, crime 
victimization, and experience with institutions that deal with crime. A longitudinal study that 
provides information about individual’s experience with the police and judicial system will be 
very valuable in order to determine what policies are adequate for diminishing crime in Mexico.  
From this analysis it is also evident that trust in the local police has deteriorated 
significantly over time, and that the impact of insecurity has a larger negative effect on trust in 
this institution. This presents a significant challenge to authorities since local police is usually 
the first filter when dealing with crime. Thus, from this analysis it can be concluded that special 
efforts to improve the efficiency and reliability of local police forces should be an important 
policy priority when dealing with crime in Mexico.  
It is also necessary to implement programs that focus on diminishing corruption and 
increasing transparency in the police and judicial system to improve trust. Making the process of 
officially reporting a crime accessible to all citizens, increasing the effectiveness of the process 
of solving a crime, and communicating improvements on these institutions to the general public 
can significantly affect the level of trust. In the case of Mexico, the detrimental effect of 
insecurity on trust in institutions overlaps with a period of time in which the government has 
undertaken a major actions to diminish drug trafficking. Because of these circumstances, a 
program at the federal level that focuses on improving transparency and communicating to its 
citizens the actions taken to enhance the effectiveness of the police and judicial systems is likely 
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Figure 3. Heat map of intentional homicides rate, percentage change 2006-2010 
  
Figure 4. Heat map of organized crime related homicides, percentage change 2007-2010 
 
  38
Figure 3. Homicides related to organized crime 2007-2010 for most violent states*  
*Figure constructed with Presidencia de la Republica Data (2011) and state categorization provided by 




Figure 4. Homicides related to organized crime 2007-2010 other states with high violence* 
*Figure constructed using Presidencia de la Republica Data (2011) and state categorization provided by 















































Table 1. Official Crime Statistics 2006-2010 (selected years) 
Intentional homicidesb Intentional homicidesb Org. crime homicidesc 
(per100,000) (per100,000) (Total) 
State Regiona 2001 2005 %change 2006 2010 %change 2007 2010 %change 
Aguascalientes Centronorte 2 2 0 2 6 200 37 46 24 
Baja California Noroeste 18 19 6 17 27 59 209 540 158 
Baja California Sur Noroeste 6 7 17 4 8 100 6 10 67 
Campeche Sureste 7 7 0 4 7 75 11 14 27 
Chiapas Suroeste 5 6 20 8 10 25 57 77 35 
Chihuahua Noroeste 10 8 -20 18 103 472 244 4427 1714 
Coahuila Noreste 31 10 -68 4 14 250 18 384 2033 
Colima Occidente 16 17 6 5 15 200 2 101 4950 
Distrito Federal Centrosur 9 8 -11 7 9 29 182 191 5 
Durango Noroeste 22 12 -45 13 66 408 108 834 672 
Guanajuato Centronorte 5 4 -20 5 9 80 51 152 198 
Guerrero Suroeste 40 24 -40 27 48 78 299 1137 280 
Hidalgo Oriente 6 5 -17 4 6 50 43 52 21 
Jalisco Occidente 8 6 -25 6 12 100 70 593 747 
México Centrosur 22 17 -23 19 8 -58 111 623 461 
Michoacán Occidente 12 11 -8 17 18 6 328 520 59 
Morelos Centrosur 12 10 -17 10 33 230 32 335 947 
Nayarit Occidente 13 10 -23 10 38 280 11 377 3327 
Nuevo León Noreste 4 3 -25 4 18 350 130 620 377 
Oaxaca Suroeste 37 30 -19 30 14 -53 62 167 169 
Puebla Oriente 10 6 -40 8 7 -13 6 51 750 
Querétaro Centronorte 6 4 -33 3 3 0 5 13 160 
Quintana Roo Sureste 27 11 -59 10 22 120 26 64 146 
San Luis Potosí Centronorte 8 7 -13 5 12 140 10 135 1250 
Sinaloa Noroeste 21 23 10 23 85 270 426 1815 326 
Sonora Noroeste 8 11 38 10 26 160 141 495 251 
Tabasco Sureste 9 4 -56 8 7 -13 27 73 170 
Tamaulipas Noreste 6 12 100 11 22 100 80 1209 1411 
Tlaxcala Oriente 35 33 -6 15 4 -73 0 4 - 
Veracruz Oriente 7 6 -14 6 5 -17 75 179 139 
Yucatán Sureste 1 1 0 1 2 100 4 2 -50 
Zacatecas Centronorte 7 4 -43 4 7 75 18 37 106 
National 14 11 -21 11 18 64 2829 15277 440 
a Regions: Northeast = Noreste, Northwest= Noroeste, Occidente = West, Oriente = East, North-Central = Centronorte, South-Central = 
Centrosur, Southeastern = Sureste, and Southwestern = Suroeste.  
b Intentional Homicides per 100,000 habitants (rounded up, official statistics). Source: Instituto Ciudadano de Estudio Sobre la 
Inseguridad (ICESI, 2011b). A homicide in which the death of a person is caused intentionally is considered intentional homicide. 
c Homicides related to organized crime, total number (collection of these statistics started in 2006).  Homicides considered for this 
category are based on the characteristics of the execution based on place, sex, age, and message. Deaths considered for this category also 
include deaths that resulted from attacks and confrontation between the authorities and criminal organizations, and between criminal 
organizations (without the presence of authority). Source: Presidencia de la Republica (2011). 
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Most violent states 
Baja California    X    6.3 
Chihuahua X       30 
Michoacán     X   5.4 
Nuevo León      X  2.6 
Sinaloa X X X     13 
Tamaulipas      X  3 
Other states with high violence 
Chiapas   X      
Coahuila   X      
Durango X X X      
Guanajuato     X    
Guerrero  X X  X  X  
Jalisco  X       
Morelos       X  
Quintana Roo   X      
Sonora  X       
Tabasco     X           
X indicates whether which cartel is fighting for control in the specific state 
Most violent states are those in which 80% of organized crimes are concentrated 
a % calculated as of August of 2010 by SEGOB (2011). Source: SEGOB (2011) 
 
 
Table 3. Select data from LAPOP and ENSI data 
 
  LAPOP LAPOP LAPOP LAPOP t-test  
 2004 2006 2008 2010 04 & 10  
Perception of insecurity index (average)a 2.225 2.355 2.198 2.316 -2.819*** 
% of population victim of a crime 17.346 20.194 16.121 25.928 -5.836*** 
           
 ENSI-3 ENSI-5 ENSI-6 ENSI-7  
 2004 2007 2008 2009  
% of population victim of a crime 11.3 10.8 11.5 10.1  
% of households with crime victim  13 13.1 13.7  
% that feels insecure in its state 54 59 65 65  
% that believes that crime affected life quality a lot 9 10 14 22  
% for ENSI data calculated for the population 18 years and older. Source: LAPOP and ENSI 




Table 4. Empirical Analysis on the relationship between perceptions of insecurity (PI) and crime 
victimization (CV) on support and satisfaction with democracy and trust in institutions 
 






& 14 AC 
PI Æ (-) on support and satisfaction for democracy in 
LAC, CVÆ (-) satisfaction with democracy 
Cenabou et al. 
(2011) 
LAPOP 2006 10 LAC CV Æ (-) effect on satisfaction with democracy (no effect 
on support) 
Cruz (2008) LAPOP 2006 21 LAC PI Æ (-) effect on support for democracy 
PI & CV Æ (-) effect on rule of law 
Bateson (2010) LAPOP 2008 18 LAC CV Æ (-) effect on support and trust for democracy 
Salinas & Booth 
(2011) 
LAPOP 2008 18 LAC PI Æ (-) effect on support for democracy 
CV Æ no effect 
Maldonado 
(2010) 
LAPOP 2010 23 LAC PI Æ (+) effect on government overthrow  
CV Æ no effect on government overthrow 
Ahmad et al. 
(2011) 
LAPOP 2010 26 LAC PI & CV Æ trust in the police 
Perez (2003) Latinobarometro 
1996 & 1998 
2 CAC PI Æ (-) effect on trust in the police and democracy (ELS 
& GTM) CV Æ support for military coup (ELS) 
Cruz (2006) LAPOP 1999 3 CAC CV Æ (-) effect on support to the political system in all 
cases, PI Æ (-) effect only for GTM & ELS (NIC no 
effect) 
Malone (2010) LAPOP 2008 6 CAC PI & CV Æ (-) effect in support for judicial system 




LAPOP 2004 MEX Corruption Æ (-) effect on democracy 
Paras & Coleman 
(2006) 
LAPOP 2006 MEX PI & CV Æ (-) effect on trust in institutions 
Malone (2009) LAPOP 2008 MEX PI Æ (-) effect in support for democracy and rule of law, 
CV Æ (-) effect on the rule of law 
Paras & Moreno 
(2008) 
LAPOP 2008 MEX PI & CV Æ (-) effect on trust in institutions 
Paras et al (2010) LAPOP 2010 MEX PI Æ (-) effect on support for democracy 
PI & CV Æ NS effect on rule of law 
LAC = Latin American countries, CAC = Central American countries, AC = African countries 
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Table 5. Summary Statistics – LAPOP data for 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010  
2004 2006 2008 2010  All years 
 Variable Obs Mean S.D. Obs Mean S.D. Obs Mean S.D. Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Insecurity index 1545 2.22 0.88 1536 2.36 0.93 1557 2.20 0.89 1553 2.32 0.92 1 4
Victim  1545 0.17 0.38 1545 0.20 0.40 1557 0.16 0.37 1562 0.26 0.44 0 1
Support democracy index 1451 5.19 1.58 1466 5.15 1.66 1488 5.11 1.74 1477 5.01 1.64 1 7
Satisfaction democracy index 1498 2.52 0.65 1479 2.47 0.68 1497 2.53 0.68 1503 2.35 0.74 1 4
Support democracy 2 1424 1.95 0.51 1357 2.00 0.52 1459 2.00 0.50 1438 2.05 0.53 1 3
Trust in the political system 1506 4.79 1.71 1504 5.15 1.68 1527 4.96 1.79 1522 4.96 1.78 1 7
Trust in the electoral system 1527 4.28 1.91 1498 5.04 1.74 1532 4.70 1.91 1532 4.44 1.95 1 7
Trust in the congress  1455 4.11 1.70 1444 4.53 1.66 1457 4.33 1.75 1461 4.24 1.71 1 7
Trust in the government  1510 4.28 1.74 1490 4.53 1.76 1530 4.59 1.79 1530 4.54 1.77 1 7
Trust in the courts system 1438 4.19 1.71 1473 4.12 1.70 1406 4.00 1.75 1452 3.80 1.62 1 7
Trust in the judicial system 1523 4.01 1.69 1512 4.04 1.75 1525 4.05 1.81 1536 3.88 1.70 1 7
Trust in the police 1530 3.55 1.88 1523 3.26 1.86 1554 3.62 1.83 1552 3.18 1.77 1 7
Trust in the army 1501 5.06 1.67 1495 5.35 1.66 1518 5.25 1.78 1513 5.33 1.68 1 7
Female 1556 0.50 0.50 1560 0.51 0.50 1560 0.51 0.50 1562 0.50 0.50 0 1
Relationship 1554 0.70 0.46 1549 0.69 0.46 1546 0.67 0.47 1559 0.63 0.48 0 1
Kids 1556 0.77 0.42 1552 0.76 0.43 1556 0.74 0.44 1547 0.72 0.45 0 1
White 1483 0.19 0.40 1465 0.23 0.42 1458 0.26 0.44 1458 0.17 0.38 0 1
Mestiza 1483 0.69 0.46 1465 0.66 0.47 1458 0.61 0.49 1458 0.73 0.44 0 1
City Size 1556 3.04 1.49 1560 3.05 1.49 1560 3.05 1.49 1562 2.93 1.43 1 5
Education 1555 8.22 4.42 1559 8.57 4.30 1560 8.27 4.47 1559 8.95 4.44 0 18
Income level 1436 4.42 2.28 1283 4.56 2.35 1346 4.58 2.31 1393 4.28 2.48 0 10
Age 1556 39.22 14.97 1558 37.61 14.31 1558 40.84 16.67 1558 39.42 15.78 18 90
GDP per capita 1556 70.43 35.61 1560 75.46 38.36 1560 77.93 39.77 1562 67.76 34.10 31.45 172.48
Life expectancy 1556 74.31 0.73 1560 74.88 0.73 1560 75.18 0.70 1562 75.46 0.70 72.58 76.50
All variables at the individual level obtained from LAPOP (2011). GDP per capita at the state level constructed using total real GDP (2003 
constant prices, from Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia, INEGI, 2011) and dividing it by total population (from Consejo Nacional 
de la Poblacion, CONAPO, 2011). GDP per capita not available for 2010, but it was filled in with linear extrapolation. Life expectancy at the 
state level obtained from CONAPO (2011).  
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Table 6. Summary Statistics – ENSI data for 2004, 2007, 2008, and 2009  
  2004 2007 2008 2009 All years 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Obs Mean S.D. Obs Mean S.D. Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Victim 57398 0.11 0.32 30670 0.09 0.28 56172 0.11 0.32 60461 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Insecure 55610 0.52 0.50 29534 0.57 0.49 54571 0.66 0.47 59456 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Trust local police 48310 2.02 0.69 23817 1.98 0.62 37675 1.93 0.62 45133 1.87 0.56 1 3 
Trust transit police 39836 1.97 0.69 22887 1.91 0.64 37584 1.88 0.64 44870 1.85 0.58 1 3 
Trust state police (jud) 30526 1.96 0.74 18394 1.96 0.64 25553 1.94 0.66 12941 1.94 0.61 1 3 
Trust  AFI 14466 2.28 0.72 14713 2.18 0.67 19363 2.15 0.68 8600 2.07 0.62 1 3 
Trust fed police(prev) 19964 2.32 0.69 15466 2.16 0.65 21635 2.15 0.66 29246 2.10 0.62 1 3 
Trust federal police    28413 2.33 1.06 51312 2.26 1.10 57091 2.12 0.98 1 4 
Trust public ministry    27796 1.99 0.95 50215 1.97 0.97 56492 2.02 0.93 1 4 
Trust army    28726 2.81 1.09 52867 2.94 1.13 58070 2.78 1.11 1 4 
Trust political parties    29671 1.59 0.82 54156 1.59 0.84 59473 1.64 0.80 1 4 
Urban 57398 0.76 0.43 31088 0.83 0.38 56175 0.76 0.42 60461 0.76 0.42 0 1 
Female 57398 0.55 0.50 31088 0.57 0.49 56175 0.55 0.50 60461 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Age 57289 40.95 16.12 30780 41.58 16.71 55940 41.73 16.38 60145 41.85 16.62 18 97 
Primary 57189 0.22 0.41 30536 0.44 0.50 56175 0.40 0.49 56144 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Sec. and high school 57189 0.30 0.46 30536 0.38 0.48 56175 0.38 0.49 56144 0.24 0.43 0 1 
High school more 57189 0.22 0.41 30536 0.18 0.39 56175 0.22 0.41 56144 0.39 0.49 0 1 
No educ 57189 0.26 0.44 30536 0.00 0.00 56175 0.00 0.00 56144 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Employed 57378 0.57 0.49 30691 0.54 0.50 56114 0.64 0.48 60456 0.57 0.50 0 1 
Unemployed 57378 0.05 0.21 30691 0.01 0.10 56114 0.01 0.11 60456 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Not labor force 57378 0.38 0.49 30691 0.45 0.50 56114 0.35 0.48 60456 0.37 0.48 0 1 
GDP per capita 57398 78.36 63.42 31088 79.53 56.99 56175 80.84 55.47 60461 75.83 48.91 32.88 467.60 
Life expectancy 57398 74.35 0.73 31088 75.01 0.66 56175 75.26 0.71 60461 75.36 0.67 72.58 76.37 
Distance border 57398 750.42 362.12 31088 813.77 323.58 56175 772.67 354.31 60461 761.28 348.04 167.87 1370.17 
Narco density (98-01) 57398 53.08 44.03 31088 40.71 37.44 56175 51.61 44.73 60461 50.20 42.98 4.26 143.57 
Marihuaha (hec) 57398 1.01 1.62 31088 0.77 1.49 56175 1.19 2.01 60461 0.87 1.83 0 8.09 
Noroeste 57398 0.26 0.44 31088 0.15 0.36 56175 0.25 0.43 60461 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Noreste 57398 0.09 0.28 31088 0.10 0.29 56175 0.06 0.24 60461 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Year trend 57398 0.00 0.00 31088 1.00 0.00 56175 2.00 0.00 60461 3.00 0.00 0 3 
All variables at the individual level obtained from ENSI (2011). GDP per capita at the state level constructed using total real GDP (2003 constant prices, INEGI, 2011) and 
dividing it by total population (from CONAPO, 2011). Life expectancy at the state level obtained from CONAPO (2011). Distance to the border calculated as the distance to the 
closest major border city, narco density represents the number of criminals involved in drug trafficking with residency in the state, and marihuana is the number of hectares (per 
1000) confiscated in the state. Year trend ranges from 0 to 3 for each survey wave (for 2004 equal to 0, for 2009 equal to 3). 
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Table 7. Impact of insecurity and crime victimization on democracy – LAPOP data 
 






















model 2  
(8) 
Insecurity ind. -0.1242*** -0.3187***  0.0279 0.1152**  
 (0.0353) (0.0401)   (0.0593) (0.0533)   
Victim   -0.0556 -0.2319***  0.3863*** -0.0762 
   (0.0741) (0.0725)   (0.1125) (0.1219) 
Female 0.0637 0.0855 0.0436 0.0259 0.1068 -0.1755** 0.1433 -0.1802** 
 (0.0511) (0.0557) (0.0512) (0.0551) (0.0878) (0.0882) (0.0898) (0.0881) 
Relationship -0.0448 -0.1381 -0.0553 -0.1794** 0.0742 -0.2692** 0.0765 -0.2519** 
 (0.0714) (0.0848) (0.0708) (0.0847) (0.1345) (0.1247) (0.1343) (0.1248) 
Kids 0.0371 -0.0261 0.0371 -0.026 -0.1165 0.1525 -0.1176 0.1551 
 (0.0838) (0.0955) (0.0839) (0.0943) (0.1584) (0.1460) (0.1574) (0.1477) 
White -0.0326 0.0831 -0.0335 0.0476 -0.1113 0.038 -0.0938 0.0488 
 (0.1167) (0.1249) (0.1168) (0.1215) (0.1649) (0.1961) (0.1657) (0.1962) 
Mestizo 0.0507 0.0714 0.056 0.051 -0.2865** -0.2095 -0.2797* -0.2124 
 (0.1005) (0.1094) (0.1010) (0.1058) (0.1448) (0.1652) (0.1447) (0.1651) 
City size 0.021 0.0618* 0.0412 0.0940*** 0.0487 -0.002 0.047 -0.0266 
 (0.0322) (0.0360) (0.0319) (0.0348) (0.0514) (0.0520) (0.0510) (0.0522) 
Education 0.0297*** -0.0347*** 0.0327*** -0.0329*** -0.0245* -0.0588*** -0.0285** -0.0596*** 
 (0.0087) (0.0094) (0.0087) (0.0094) (0.0139) (0.0135) (0.0139) (0.0135) 
Income 0.0918*** 0.0307* 0.0926*** 0.0379** -0.0438* -0.0102 -0.0475** -0.0149 
 (0.0156) (0.0164) (0.0155) (0.0161) (0.0239) (0.0262) (0.0237) (0.0263) 
Age 0.0122*** 0.0004 0.0130*** 0.0011 -0.0100*** -0.0166*** -0.0097** -0.0177*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0037) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0034) 
GDP per capita -0.0067 0.0091 -0.0086 0.0076 -0.0376** -0.0215* -0.0369** -0.0199 
 (0.0116) (0.0111) (0.0115) (0.0109) (0.0168) (0.0128) (0.0169) (0.0128) 
Life expect. -0.4298 -1.4763** -0.2672 -1.1894** -0.5799 -0.3636 -0.6538 -0.49 
 (0.5171) (0.5939) (0.5196) (0.5996) (0.8010) (0.8668) (0.7972) (0.8757) 
Year 2004 -0.2723 -1.3536* -0.0695 -1.0143 -0.2897 -0.8765 -0.3409 -1.0617 
 (0.6286) (0.7099) (0.6294) (0.7173) (0.9624) (1.0225) (0.9555) (1.0316) 
Year 2006 -0.005 -0.553 0.0907 -0.3817 0.0579 -0.3639 0.0315 -0.4557 
 (0.3532) (0.3953) (0.3542) (0.3983) (0.5413) (0.5562) (0.5373) (0.5610) 
Year 2008 0.0625 -0.1495 0.139 -0.0449 0.2877 -0.1995 0.3053 -0.2806 
 (0.2221) (0.2478) (0.2213) (0.2489) (0.3508) (0.3363) (0.3482) (0.3391) 
Observations 4896 4950 4900 4958 4747 4747 4749 4749 
Log-likelihood -8490 -4977 -8503 -5029 -3476 -3476 -3470 -3470 
Wald Chisq 211 217 190 177 246 246 257 257 
R-sq(pseudo) 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Coefficients with cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance notated at * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
Estimates for cut-off estimates and state dummies and not included for purpose of space. Ordered logit estimates in 
columns 1-5, and multinomial logit estimates in columns 5-8.  Reference group:  male, no relationship (single, separated, 
divorced, widow/widower), no kids, indigenous or other race, and year 2010. 
 
  45


























Insec. index -0.1082*** -0.1843*** -0.2225*** -0.2434*** -0.2192*** -0.3146*** -0.3371*** -0.2088*** 
 (0.0383) (0.0360) (0.0330) (0.0346) (0.0323) (0.0361) (0.0347) (0.0345) 
Female 0.1168** 0.0295 -0.0232 0.0714 -0.0466 0.0364 0.0887* -0.2689*** 
 (0.0525) (0.0522) (0.0533) (0.0497) (0.0542) (0.0510) (0.0484) (0.0540) 
Relationship -0.0075 0.1028 -0.1007 -0.0406 0.0648 0.0249 -0.0471 -0.0548 
 (0.0729) (0.0771) (0.0690) (0.0693) (0.0748) (0.0713) (0.0710) (0.0738) 
Kids 0.0221 -0.1204 0.1856** 0.0765 -0.1446* 0.0292 0.1029 0.1597* 
 (0.0891) (0.0837) (0.0788) (0.0817) (0.0856) (0.0829) (0.0824) (0.0908) 
White 0.0618 0.1423 0.1696 0.1762 0.2792** 0.2195* 0.1851 -0.1575 
 (0.1093) (0.1122) (0.1211) (0.1258) (0.1149) (0.1277) (0.1244) (0.1192) 
Mestizo -0.0611 0.0686 0.1962* 0.0935 0.0483 0.1534 0.1247 -0.1121 
 (0.0878) (0.0966) (0.1064) (0.1088) (0.0923) (0.1055) (0.1011) (0.0990) 
City size 0.0713* 0.0475 0.0293 0.0761** 0.0316 0.044 0.1056*** -0.0108 
 (0.0368) (0.0312) (0.0296) (0.0321) (0.0331) (0.0375) (0.0397) (0.0307) 
Education 0.013 -0.0192** -0.0169* -0.0204** -0.0264*** -0.0075 -0.0111 -0.0069 
 (0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0088) (0.0087) (0.0085) (0.0087) 
Income -0.0321** 0.0122 0.011 -0.0093 0.0276* -0.0138 0.0002 0.0121 
 (0.0149) (0.0154) (0.0152) (0.0145) (0.0153) (0.0150) (0.0157) (0.0146) 
Age 0.0076*** -0.0082*** -0.0052** 0.0013 -0.0013 0.0002 -0.0018 -0.0025 
 (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
GDP per cap. -0.0017 -0.0275*** -0.0026 -0.0083 -0.0015 -0.0017 0.0034 -0.0307*** 
 (0.0087) (0.0093) (0.0084) (0.0082) (0.0093) (0.0084) (0.0104) (0.0079) 
Life expect. -0.2105 -1.1596** -0.483 -1.1779** -1.3859*** -0.6109 -1.0180* -1.2328*** 
 (0.4895) (0.5125) (0.4490) (0.4924) (0.5170) (0.4955) (0.5671) (0.4358) 
Year 2004 -0.4918 -1.5007** -0.77 -1.7254*** -1.2476** -0.6392 -0.8942 -1.7821*** 
 (0.5824) (0.6371) (0.5368) (0.5833) (0.6363) (0.5928) (0.6861) (0.5205) 
Year 2006 0.0978 0.1365 0.1353 -0.5767* -0.4537 -0.1926 -0.6087 -0.4664 
 (0.3177) (0.3479) (0.2931) (0.3296) (0.3445) (0.3305) (0.3740) (0.2909) 
Year 2008 -0.1125 0.1233 -0.0792 -0.3213 -0.2568 -0.1002 0.0194 -0.1925 
 (0.2041) (0.2237) (0.1950) (0.2212) (0.2170) (0.2296) (0.2397) (0.1961) 
Observations 5016 5030 4856 5015 4786 5043 5075 4998 
Log-lik. -8936 -9278 -8924 -9192 -8782 -9307 -9276 -8480 
Wald Chi sq 203.2 288.1 247.6 284.4 272.3 257.5 351.5 224.2 
R-sq(pseudo) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Ordered logit coefficients with cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance notated at * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** 
p<.01. Estimates for cut-off estimates and state dummies and not included for purpose of space. Reference group:  male, no 






Table 9. Impact of crime victimization on trust on institutions – LAPOP data 
 
























Victim -0.2314*** -0.2709*** -0.2369*** -0.2110*** -0.3143*** -0.4259*** -0.3160*** -0.1803*** 
 (0.0690) (0.0655) (0.0624) (0.0695) (0.0707) (0.0642) (0.0658) (0.0671) 
Female 0.0862 -0.0128 -0.0672 0.0258 -0.0998* -0.0275 0.0288 -0.3027*** 
 (0.0526) (0.0519) (0.0535) (0.0497) (0.0539) (0.0507) (0.0486) (0.0542) 
Relationship -0.0346 0.0757 -0.1211* -0.0706 0.0316 -0.0221 -0.0958 -0.0815 
 (0.0730) (0.0772) (0.0686) (0.0694) (0.0750) (0.0720) (0.0726) (0.0738) 
Kids 0.0338 -0.1132 0.1803** 0.0709 -0.1459* 0.0384 0.1162 0.1545* 
 (0.0888) (0.0844) (0.0779) (0.0815) (0.0850) (0.0847) (0.0844) (0.0912) 
White 0.0578 0.1274 0.1373 0.1617 0.2562** 0.1922 0.1694 -0.1586 
 (0.1090) (0.1121) (0.1201) (0.1255) (0.1163) (0.1296) (0.1262) (0.1204) 
Mestizo -0.0596 0.0596 0.1785* 0.0836 0.0386 0.1399 0.1198 -0.1052 
 (0.0880) (0.0973) (0.1049) (0.1076) (0.0923) (0.1071) (0.1008) (0.0992) 
City size 0.0817** 0.0630** 0.0514* 0.1029*** 0.0513 0.0737* 0.1384*** 0.0126 
 (0.0361) (0.0313) (0.0302) (0.0323) (0.0335) (0.0377) (0.0402) (0.0310) 
Education 0.0150* -0.0172** -0.0136 -0.0185** -0.0230** -0.0028 -0.0073 -0.0039 
 (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0084) (0.0087) 
Income -0.0293** 0.0181 0.0135 -0.005 0.0323** -0.007 0.0077 0.0146 
 (0.0147) (0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0143) (0.0153) (0.0149) (0.0157) (0.0145) 
Age 0.0076*** -0.0080*** -0.0044** 0.0021 -0.0007 0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0015 
 (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
GDP per cap. -0.0026 -0.0294*** -0.0043 -0.0096 -0.0038 -0.0041 0.0011 -0.0313*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0092) (0.0084) (0.0082) (0.0095) (0.0085) (0.0106) (0.0079) 
Life expect. -0.0359 -0.9946** -0.2946 -0.9796** -1.1526** -0.3405 -0.658 -0.9508** 
 (0.4968) (0.5049) (0.4558) (0.4937) (0.5185) (0.4998) (0.5637) (0.4378) 
Year 2004 -0.2985 -1.3005** -0.5408 -1.4751** -0.9832 -0.3414 -0.4653 -1.4459*** 
 (0.5896) (0.6227) (0.5433) (0.5831) (0.6372) (0.5944) (0.6807) (0.5220) 
Year 2006 0.2084 0.2366 0.234 -0.4531 -0.3149 -0.0426 -0.3993 -0.3166 
 (0.3225) (0.3422) (0.2997) (0.3323) (0.3468) (0.3353) (0.3744) (0.2935) 
Year 2008 -0.0576 0.1894 0.0038 -0.2376 -0.1821 -0.0098 0.1581 -0.0929 
 (0.2059) (0.2194) (0.1995) (0.2215) (0.2176) (0.2307) (0.2408) (0.1967) 
Observations 5022 5035 4865 5024 4794 5051 5083 5002 
Log-lik. -8950 -9298 -8964 -9233 -8811 -9362 -9342 -8519 
Wald Chi sq 209.6 284.1 219.4 249.2 245.3 229.3 267.2 195.4 
R-sq(pseudo) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Ordered logit coefficients with cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance notated at * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** 
p<.01. Estimates for cut-off estimates and state dummies and not included for purpose of space. Reference group:  male, no 
relationship (single, separated, divorced, widow/widower), no kids, indigenous or other race, and year 2010. 
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Table 10. Impact of insecurity on trust in institutions – ENSI data 
 Local pol Transit pol. State pol AFI Fed pol prev Fed police Public minist Army Pol parties 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Insecurity index -0.6714*** -0.5624*** -0.5415*** -0.3731*** -0.4357*** -0.4380*** -0.5718*** -0.2771*** -0.4995*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0215) (0.0270) (0.0335) (0.0268) (0.0201) (0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0206) 
Urban -0.6714*** -0.2609*** -0.3270*** -0.2590*** -0.1894*** -0.1102*** -0.2215*** -0.0296 -0.1844*** 
 (0.9792)  (0.0304) (0.0372) (0.0487) (0.0375) (0.0303) (0.0301) (0.0310) (0.0306) 
Female -0.6714*** 0.0686*** 0.0253 -0.1353*** -0.2028*** -0.1636*** 0.0076 -0.3114*** 0.005 
 (1.9792)  (0.0233) (0.0306) (0.0500) (0.0406) (0.0224) (0.0222) (0.0252) (0.0252) 
Age -0.6714*** -0.0057* -0.0343*** -0.0349*** -0.0255*** -0.0208*** -0.0219*** 0.004 -0.0122*** 
 (2.9792)  (0.0034) (0.0044) (0.0057) (0.0045) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0030) 
Age squared -0.6714*** 0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** -0.0001* 0.0001*** 
 (3.9792)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)  
Primary -0.6714*** -0.0969** -0.2490*** -0.2062** -0.0525 0.052 0.0946** 0.0289 -0.0454 
 (4.9792)  (0.0418) (0.0613) (0.0920) (0.0569) (0.0380) (0.0407) (0.0386) (0.0400) 
Sec and high -0.6714*** -0.2026*** -0.4718*** -0.2521*** -0.062 0.0789* 0.0329 0.1532*** -0.0946** 
 (5.9792)  (0.0439) (0.0621) (0.0947) (0.0591) (0.0403) (0.0422) (0.0407) (0.0426) 
More than high -0.6714*** -0.2585*** -0.6757*** -0.4154*** -0.1890*** 0.1199*** 0.0153 0.2262*** -0.0589 
 (6.9792)  (0.0428) (0.0618) (0.0897) (0.0541) (0.0390) (0.0416) (0.0391) (0.0410) 
Work -0.6714*** -0.0433* -0.0523 -0.1030* -0.0583 -0.0137 0.0071 -0.0712*** -0.0024 
 (7.9792)  (0.0250) (0.0328) (0.0536) (0.0433) (0.0236) (0.0230) (0.0270) (0.0275) 
No work -0.6714*** -0.0783 -0.0739 -0.0943 -0.0425 -0.0165 -0.0549 -0.0359 -0.0023 
 (8.9792)  (0.0546) (0.0799) (0.0985) (0.0740) (0.0487) (0.0513) (0.0508) (0.0524) 
GDP per capita -0.6714*** 0.0046*** 0.0002 0.0023 0.0035 0.0031 0.0032 -0.0086*** 0.0111*** 
 (9.9792)  (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0030) 
Life expect. -0.6714*** 0.9910*** 1.0411*** 0.2987 0.7772*** 0.1496 0.341 -1.9825** -1.1413 
 (10.9792)  (0.1712) (0.2161) (0.2842) (0.2354) (0.8597) (0.8955) (0.9331) (1.0216) 
Year 2004 -0.6714*** 1.1382*** 0.8247*** 0.9688*** 1.4073***     
 (11.9792)  (0.1716) (0.2112) (0.2788) (0.2297)     
Year 2007 -0.6714*** 0.2597*** 0.1752** 0.3002*** 0.3302*** 0.2812 -0.0876 -0.5740** -0.5343* 
 (12.9792)  (0.0601) (0.0741) (0.0959) (0.0836) (0.2626) (0.2726) (0.2863) (0.3084) 
Year 2008 -0.6714*** 0.0770** 0.068 0.2473*** 0.2081*** 0.1714 -0.1184 0.0258 -0.4009** 
 (13.9792)  (0.0369) (0.0496) (0.0620) (0.0501) (0.1363) (0.1409) (0.1467) (0.1616) 
Observations 148000 139460 84659 55431 83426 129371 127212 131749 134916 
F value 75.66 77.53 46.51 22.85 42.7 54.77 66.35 63.49 42.74 
Coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. Significance notated at * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Estimates for state dummies not included for purpose of space. 
Ordered logit estimates considering clusters and weights (no stratification; svy Stata command). Reference group: no education, not in labor force, and year 2009. 
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Table 11. Impact of crime victimization on trust in institutions – ENSI data 
  Local pol Transit pol. State pol AFI Fed pol prev Fed police Public minist Army Pol parties 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Victim -0.5107*** -0.4350*** -0.4253*** -0.3502*** -0.2843*** -0.2384*** -0.4278*** -0.0498 -0.2794*** 
 (0.0307) (0.0299) (0.0384) (0.0475) (0.0389) (0.0300) (0.0293) (0.0314) (0.0316) 
Urban -0.4812*** -0.2760*** -0.3264*** -0.2646*** -0.2045*** -0.1256*** -0.2410*** -0.0463 -0.2011*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0300) (0.0367) (0.0481) (0.0373) (0.0302) (0.0300) (0.0308) (0.0309) 
Female -0.0171 0.0294 -0.0106 -0.1633*** -0.2312*** -0.1933*** -0.0291 -0.3271*** -0.0268 
 (0.0215) (0.0223) (0.0292) (0.0479) (0.0392) (0.0215) (0.0210) (0.0245) (0.0240) 
Age -0.0074** -0.0092*** -0.0363*** -0.0367*** -0.0272*** -0.0233*** -0.0237*** 0.0029 -0.0151*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0044) (0.0056) (0.0044) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) 
Age squared 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.00001 0.0002*** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0001) (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)  
Primary -0.1876*** -0.0998** -0.2435*** -0.1935** -0.0561 0.0338 0.0744* 0.0224 -0.0711* 
 (0.0378) (0.0416) (0.0611) (0.0909) (0.0562) (0.0372) (0.0396) (0.0380) (0.0390) 
Sec and high -0.2160*** -0.1972*** -0.4524*** -0.2343** -0.067 0.0644 0.0234 0.1423*** -0.1197*** 
 (0.0393) (0.0434) (0.0614) (0.0931) (0.0579) (0.0393) (0.0412) (0.0398) (0.0416) 
More than high -0.2386*** -0.2334*** -0.6427*** -0.3929*** -0.1848*** 0.1174*** 0.0273 0.2165*** -0.0702* 
 (0.0394) (0.0426) (0.0614) (0.0891) (0.0540) (0.0384) (0.0409) (0.0386) (0.0404) 
Work -0.0411* -0.0307 -0.0439 -0.0950* -0.0515 -0.0033 0.0184 -0.0666** 0.008 
 (0.0232) (0.0242) (0.0313) (0.0511) (0.0413) (0.0226) (0.0219) (0.0262) (0.0260) 
No work -0.1800*** -0.0656 -0.056 -0.1051 -0.045 -0.0166 -0.0461 -0.0356 -0.002 
 (0.0520) (0.0541) (0.0798) (0.0966) (0.0726) (0.0482) (0.0504) (0.0504) (0.0514) 
GDP per capita 0.0017 0.0045*** 0.0005 0.003 0.003 0.0032 0.0025 -0.0085*** 0.0109*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0030) (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0030) 
Life expect. 0.7821*** 1.0991*** 1.1459*** 0.3497 0.8653*** 0.3412 0.8573 -1.9135** -0.7996 
 (0.1690) (0.1709) (0.2149) (0.2823) (0.2339) (0.8381) (0.8742) (0.9053) (1.0100) 
Year 2004 1.2090*** 1.3162*** 1.0011*** 1.0586*** 1.5444***    
 (0.1706) (0.1713) (0.2097) (0.2764) (0.2287)     
Year 2007 0.4676*** 0.3373*** 0.2365*** 0.3184*** 0.3887*** 0.3678 0.1092 -0.5363* -0.406 
 (0.0595) (0.0597) (0.0738) (0.0947) (0.0819) (0.2554) (0.2649) (0.2773) (0.3031) 
Year 2008 0.2891*** 0.1038*** 0.0927* 0.2487*** 0.2344*** 0.2005 -0.0323 0.0331 -0.3409** 
 (0.0374) (0.0368) (0.0490) (0.0616) (0.0494) (0.1330) (0.1375) (0.1424) (0.1596) 
Observations 151453 142271 86329 56420 84796 132014 129799 134630 138048 
F value 58.62 65.9 41.78 22.53 39.09 43.1 49.21 60.25 31.44 
Coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. Significance notated at * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Estimates for state dummies not included for purpose of space. 
Ordered logit estimates considering clusters and weights (no stratification; svy Stata command). Reference group: no education, no labor force, and year 2009. 
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Table 12. Impact of crime victimization on trust in institutions, regional and time variation (distance to border and narco density)  
ENSI data 
 
 Local pol State pol Fed pol prev Local pol State pol Fed pol prev 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Insecurity ind. -0.6714*** -0.5415*** -0.4357*** -0.6714*** -0.5415*** -0.4357*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0270) (0.0268) (0.0208) (0.0270) (0.0268) 
Dist border 0.0015*** 0.0008*** 0.0007**    
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)    
Narco density    -0.0989*** -0.0525*** -0.0435** 
    (0.0163) (0.0202) (0.0212) 
Year 2004 0.9880*** 0.8247*** 1.4073*** 0.9880*** 0.8247*** 1.4073*** 
 (0.1710) (0.2112) (0.2297) (0.1710) (0.2112) (0.2297) 
Year 2007 0.3704*** 0.1752** 0.3302*** 0.3704*** 0.1752** 0.3302*** 
 (0.0597) (0.0741) (0.0836) (0.0597) (0.0741) (0.0836) 
Year 2008 0.2508*** 0.068 0.2081*** 0.2508*** 0.068 0.2081*** 
 (0.0374) (0.0496) (0.0501) (0.0374) (0.0496) (0.0501) 
Observations 148000 84659 83426 148000 84659 83426 
Population 1.94E+08 1.13E+08 1.13E+08 1.94E+08 1.13E+08 1.13E+08 
F value 75.66 46.51 42.7 75.66 46.51 42.7 
Coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. Significance notated at * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Estimates 
for control variables (urban, female, age, age squared, primary, sec and high, more than high, work, no work, 
GDP per capita, and life expectancy) and state dummies not included for purpose of space. Ordered logit 
estimates considering clusters and weights (no stratification; svy Stata command). Reference group: no 









Table 13. Impact of crime victimization on trust in institutions, regional and time variation (marihuana, region, and time trend)  
ENSI data 
 
 Local pol State pol Fed pol prev Local pol State pol Fed pol prev 
  (1) (2) (4) (6) (7) (9) 
Insecurity ind. -0.6699*** -0.5413*** -0.4333*** -0.6681*** -0.5405*** -0.4357*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0270) (0.0268) (0.0207) (0.0270) (0.0267) 
Marihuana 0.0630*** 0.023 0.1444***    
 (0.0171) (0.0214) (0.0216)    
Noreste    0.0438 0.3438** -0.0904 
    (0.1384) (0.1592) (0.1687) 
Noroeste    0.2998*** 0.1852 -0.1826 
    (0.1061) (0.1309) (0.1334) 
Year trend   -0.0781*** 0.042 0.0465 
    (0.0285) (0.0356) (0.0393) 
Noreste*year trend   -0.1264*** -0.1421*** -0.1029*** 
    (0.0296) (0.0337) (0.0354) 
Noroeste*year trend  -0.0455** -0.0669** -0.1416*** 
    (0.0201) (0.0268) (0.0264) 
Year 2004 1.0513*** 0.8567*** 1.6006***    
 (0.1733) (0.2138) (0.2317)    
Year 2007 0.3811*** 0.1824** 0.3682***    
 (0.0599) (0.0745) (0.0836)    
Year 2008 0.2485*** 0.0696 0.2098***    
 (0.0373) (0.0496) (0.0499)    
Observations 148000 84659 83426 148000 84659 83426 
Population 1.9E+08 1.1E+08 1.1E+08 1.9E+08 1.1E+08 1.1E+08 
F value 74.2 45.55 44.88 76.06 46.33 42.83 
Coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. Significance notated at * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Estimates 
for control variables (urban, female, age, age squared, primary, sec and high, more than high, work, no work, 
GDP per capita, and life expectancy) and state dummies not included for purpose of space. Ordered logit 
estimates considering clusters and weights (no stratification; svy Stata command). Reference group: no 
education, no labor force, and year 2009. 
 
